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#### 1 GEOFFREY V. WHITE (SBN. 068012) LAW OFFICE OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE 351 California St., Suite 1500 San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone: (415) 362-5658 3 Facsimile: (415) 362-4115 Email: gvwhite@sprynet.com 4 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 9 10 (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION) 11 Case No. CGC-07-467639 12 CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA SHEPARD. PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 13 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' Plaintiffs, DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 14 15 Date: February 11, 2008 Time: 9:30 a.m. S & Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, a Dept.: 301 Delaware corporation; STONE & 16 YOUNGBERG, LLĆ, a California corporation; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM 17 LOCKARD; and DOES ONE through TWENTY, inclusive, 18 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 27, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint herein, alleging several claims relating to their wrongful termination of employment by Defendants on October 7, 2005. On January 17, 2008, Defendants filed their Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action (Complaint, paragraphs 46-50) alleging a violation of Cal. Lab. Code Section 970, which prohibits employers from fraudulently inducing an employee to move his or her residence by knowingly false representations. Defendants claim that this Cause of Action is untimely,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT CASE NO. CGC-07-467639 - 1

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because, they assert, "Claims under Section 970 are subject to the <u>one-year</u> statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340(a) for liability based on statute." (emphasis in original) [Defendants' Memorandum at 2:12-14]. Defendants cite only one California case from 1984 in support of this proposition. Defendants further claim that the applicable statute of limitations for the Section 970 claim was not tolled because of Plaintiffs' pursuit of discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but cite no State law to support that contention. [Id at 2:23-25].

Defendants fail to point out to the Court that Cal. Code Civ. Pro. Section 340(a) was amended in 2002, to enlarge the applicable statute of limitations to a minimum of 2 years. Further, Defendants fail to analyze applicable State law regarding equitable tolling based on Plaintiffs' pursuit of Federal administrative remedies. As we demonstrate below, Defendants' Demurrer is without merit and should be overruled.

#### **ARGUMENT**

I. Under Defendants' Own Argument, the Applicable Statute of Limitations for Plaintiffs' Section 970 Claim, as a "Liability Based on Statute," is Three Years, So The Complaint Was Timely Filed.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Section 970 claim is governed by the statute of limitations for "liabilities based on statute," but the limitations period for such a claim is plainly 3 years, so the action is timely. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. Section 338(a). Analysis of case law under Section 970 shows the applicable statute of limitations is no less than 2 years, so the action is timely however it is characterized.

California courts have characterized claims under Lab. Code Section 970 as analogous to common law claims for fraudulent inducement of a contract of employment, or the tort of deceit. For example, in <u>Lazar v. Superior Court</u>, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638-39, 645 (1996) the Supreme Court discussed Section 970 as an expansion of the common law claim for fraudulent inducement of a contract of employment. Similarly, the Supreme Court characterized a Section 970 claim as based on to the tort of deceit in <u>Collins v. Rocha</u>, 7 Cal. 3d 232, 239-40 (1972).

The Courts of Appeal have also variously characterized a Section 970 claim as based on the tort of deceit, as fraud, or simply as a "statutory tort." Tyco Industries Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 156 (1985) (characterizing as "knowingly false representation"); Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1514, 1522 (1990) (characterizing as similar to a claim of fraud); Finch v. Brenda Raceway Corp., 22 Cal. App. 4th 547, 553-554 (1994) (characterizing as "intentional misrepresentation"); Burden v. County of Santa Clara, 81 Cal. App. 4th 244, 252 (2000) ("Labor Code Section 970 creates a statutory tort cause of action").

In sum, if Plaintiffs' Labor Code Section 970 claim is considered one for fraud or intentional misrepresentations, it is governed by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Cal. Code Civ. Pro. Section 338(d). If it is considered a tort, it would be governed by the general tort statute of limitations for personal injuries, which is now two years. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. Section 335.1. Accordingly, the shortest applicable period of limitations for Plaintiffs' claim is the two-year statute, so the Complaint was timely filed. Barton v. New United Motor Mfg. Co., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1209 (1996) (holding that a claim for tortious termination is governed by the personal injury statute of limitations, which is now two years).

II. This Court Need Not Resolve the Proper Characterization of a Section 970 Cause of Action and Applicable Statute of Limitations, Because California's Long-Established Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applies Where, As Here, Plaintiff Has Several Remedies Available and Pursues Federal Administrative Relief Prior to Her State Suit.

California has long recognized the doctrine of equitable tolling where a Plaintiff has several available remedies, and chooses to pursue one reasonably and in good faith. See, generally, Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Actions, §§ 668-669. The California Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that pursuit of Federal or State administrative proceedings equitably tolls the State statute of limitations. As the Supreme Court stated in Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410 (1974), California cases have established the principle that

"... regardless of whether the exhaustion of one remedy is a prerequisite to the pursuit of another, if the Defendant is not prejudiced thereby, the running of the limitations period is tolled '[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably in good faith, pursues one." (Citations omitted) (emphasis added)

[Id. at 414]

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT CASE NO. CGC-07-467639 -3 -

applied equitable tolling where the Plaintiffs had filed a Federal lawsuit claiming violation of civil rights, which was then dismissed, leading to a State lawsuit on the claims. The Court held the State limitations period was tolled by the Federal action.

"As demonstrated by Bollinger and Elkins, application of the doctrine of

Similarly, in Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 319 (1978), the Court

"As demonstrated by *Bollinger* and *Elkins*, application of the doctrine of equitable tolling requires timely notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. These elements seemingly are present here. As noted, the Federal Court, without prejudice, declined to assert jurisdiction over a timely filed State law cause of action and plaintiffs thereafter promptly asserted that cause in the proper State Court. Unquestionably, the same set of facts may be the basis for claims under both Federal and State law. We discern no reason of policy which would require Plaintiffs to file simultaneously two separate actions based upon the same facts in both State and Federal Courts, since 'duplicative proceedings are surely inefficient, awkward and laborious." (Citations omitted) (emphasis added)

[Ibid at 319].

The Supreme Court applied the equitable tolling doctrine again in Jones v. Tracy School District, 27 Cal. 3d 99, 109 (1980). There, the plaintiff first pursued Federal administrative remedies under the Fair Labor Standards Act for wage discrimination, and then filed a suit under the California Labor Code. Following Addison and Elkins, the Supreme Court held the two-year State statute of limitations had been equitably tolled by the prior Federal proceedings. The Court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to establish that she had met the requirements for equitable tolling during the period in which she was pursuing the alternative Federal remedy.

Contrary to Defendants, under the holdings of <u>Elkins</u> and <u>Addison</u>, it matters not whether the Federal and State remedies are inconsistent, and equitable tolling applies even where the remedies could have been pursued simultaneously. <u>Nichols v. Canoga Industries</u>, 83. Cal. App. 3d 956, 963-964 (1978).

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' Section 970 claim is not tolled because it is a "separate and independent" remedy [Defendants' Memorandum at 2:27] cannot avoid application of the 3-part test under Elkins and Addison. The question whether Plaintiffs' Federal and State claims are "similar" focuses on whether the prior claim adequately warned the Defendants in the subsequent claim of the need to prepare a defense. Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 925 PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

(1983); Garabedian v. Skochko, 232 Cal. App. 3d 836, 846 (1991).

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In the present case, the major injury alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint is their termination of employment, and Plaintiffs pursued appropriate efforts to mitigate that injury. Defendants' investigation of the Federal claims would necessarily involve collection of evidence to rebut the State claim; so tolling is fully applicable. Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993); Chavira v. Payless shoe Source, 140 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Cal. 1991).

More importantly, Defendants had <u>actual knowledge</u> of Plaintiffs' Section 970 claim by October 31, 2005, so there can be no question that Defendants' investigation encompassed this claim from the very outset.

III. As Shown By the Declaration of Geoffrey V. White, Filed Herewith, Plaintiffs Have Met All The Tests For Equitable Tolling Here, and Should be Allowed to Amend Their Complaint To So Allege.

As shown by the facts set forth in the Declaration of Geoffrey V. White, filed herewith, Plaintiffs sent written notice to Defendants of their Section 970 claim within three weeks of their termination from employment. This notice was a detailed recitation of the facts, and included reference to the Section 970 claim. It was followed by additional written communications between Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendants' counsel, specifically discussing the Section 970 claim in November, 2005. Plaintiffs filed a timely EEOC charge in December, 2005, and pursued conciliation efforts in good faith under the auspices of the EEOC through November, 2006, when the parties conducted a private mediation before JAMS Mediator Hon. William Cahill (Ret.). That Mediation also included the Section 970 claim. At the Defendants' request, the EEOC then conducted an expanded investigation of the employment practices of Defendants, which has not yet been concluded. Because of the delay in concluding that investigation, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on the State Court claims on September 27, 2007, in an effort to avoid further delay. Defendants certainly cannot show any prejudice by this joint pursuit of Federal and private conciliation efforts, because they fully participated in these efforts to resolve all claims arising from Plaintiffs' termination of employment, including the Section 970 claim.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT CASE NO. CGC-07-467639 - 5

**CONCLUSION** 

By:

As shown above, the true facts demonstrate that Plaintiffs' efforts to pursue Federal administrative conciliation of their claims against Defendants entitles them to equitable tolling of the State limitations period for their Section 970 claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should be given leave to amend to allege these true facts in their Complaint, and Defendants Demurrer should be overruled.

Dated: January 29, 2008

Respectfully submitted.

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8.11.1110

LAW OFFICE OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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#### **PROOF OF SERVICE**

I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Law Office of Geoffrey V. White, 351 California Street, San Francisco, CA 94104-2407. On January 29, 2008, I served the within documents:

## PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

#### DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER

#### [PROPOSED] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER

by personally delivering the documents listed above via messenger to the person(s) at the address set forth below.

Michael T. Lucey Gordon & Rees 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice and collection of processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on January 29, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

Geoffrey W. White

Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard v. Stone & Youngberg, et al. Case No. CGC-07-467639

#### 1 GEOFFREY V. WHITE (SBN, 068012) LAW OFFICE OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE 2 351 California St., Suite 1500 San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone: (415) 362-5658 3 Facsimile: (415) 362-4115 Email: gvwhite@sprynet.com 4 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 10 (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION) 11 12 **CATHERINE MOLNAR** and Case No. CGC-07-467639 PATRICIA SHEPARD, 13 DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY V. Plaintiffs, WHITE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 14 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER** v. 15 S & Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, a Date: February 11, 2008 Delaware corporation; STONE & 16 Time: 9:30 a.m. YOUNGBERG, LLC, a California Dept.: 301 17 corporation; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM LOCKARD; and DOES ONE through TWENTY, inclusive, 18 19 Defendants. 20 21 I, GEOFFREY V. WHITE, declare as follows: 22

I am an attorney at law, admitted to practice before all the Courts of this State, and the attorney for Plaintiffs herein. I make this Declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer, to demonstrate to this Court that Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their Complaint to allege the following facts to support equitable tolling of Plaintiffs' State law claims against Defendants because of their pursuit of Federal administrative remedies. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein, and could and would competently testify thereto DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

- 1 -

TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

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- 2. Three weeks after Plaintiffs were terminated on or about October 7, 2005, I wrote to Defendant Stone & Youngberg on October 31, 2005 with a detailed recitation of the facts and a demand for settlement. A true copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, although the settlement demand itself has been redacted. As part of that 5-page recitation of facts, we specifically put Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs were claiming damages under Cal. Labor Code Section 970, because of Defendants' allegedly false representations to Plaintiffs, inducing them to move their residence. Exhibit 1 at pages 2-3. We followed up that letter with a fuller discussion of the Section 970 claim in a letter to Defendants' attorneys, dated November 23, 2005.
- 3. On or about December 13, 2005, Plaintiffs timely filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging several claims of discrimination based on sex and pregnancy, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. True and complete copies of these charges are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
- 4. Shortly after the filing of these EEOC Charges, Defendants agreed to meet privately to discuss settlement of all the claims encompassed by Plaintiffs' demand letter dated October 31, 2005. Representatives of Plaintiffs and Defendants, including Defendant Lockard, along with their attorneys, met on February 2, 2006. The parties were unsuccessful in reaching a settlement, but did agree to pursue private mediation before JAMS.
- 5. During the pendancy of that JAMS Mediation, Plaintiffs' counsel also sent written notification of Plaintiffs' claims to Defendant Piazza, and requested his participation in that Mediation, providing him with a complete copy of Plaintiffs' demand letter dated October 31, 2005. A true and complete copy of that letter to Defendant Piazza, dated May 23, 2006, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
- 6. The parties agreed to hold the Mediation before JAMS Mediator Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.) and initially scheduled it for May 1, 2006. However, the Mediation was repeatedly delayed by agreement of the parties, to allow additional time for the EEOC to complete its investigation, so that both the State and Federal claims could be addressed in the course of that DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

- 7. On September 18, 2006, the EEOC issued its Determination, finding that Plaintiffs Molnar and Shepard had been discriminated against because of their sex, and subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. True and complete copies of the EEOC Determination letters for Plaintiffs are attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
- 8. On November 8, 2006, the parties and their counsel, as well as representatives of the EEOC, participated in a mediation before Mediator Cahill and attempted to resolve all of the issues presented by Plaintiffs' State and Federal claims, including Plaintiffs' claims under Labor Code Section 970. The parties were unable to reach a settlement at that time. At Defendants' request during the Mediation, the EEOC agreed to expand its investigation of the employment practices of Defendants beyond the class originally alleged by Plaintiffs. Pursuant to that agreement, the EEOC withdrew its earlier Determination Letters, pending completion of that expanded investigation. A true copy of the EEOC letter, dated January 25, 2007 is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
- 9. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint herein on September 27, 2007, because of the lengthy delays in the EEOC's investigation (at Defendants' request) of the expanded class of women employed by Defendants. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint herein in good faith, in order to address the State law issues without further delay, and with the expectation that the EEOC's investigation would be completed within in a short period of time.
- 10. Plaintiffs' counsel has recently been advised by the EEOC that it still has not completed its investigation of the expanded class.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this Declaration was executed this <u>29</u><sup>th</sup> day of January, 2008 in San Francisco, California.

LAW OFFICE OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE

By:

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY V. WHITE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639 -4 -

## **EXHIBIT 1**

OF

### **GEOFFREY V. WHITE**

351 CALIFORNIA STREET, SUITE 1500 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104-2407 TEL: (415) 362-5658 FAX: (415) 362-4115



October 31, 2005

### HAND-DELIVERED -- CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION

Kenneth Williams, President and CEO Stone & Youngberg LLC One Ferry Building San Francisco, CA 94111

Re: Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard -- Departure Agreements

Dear Mr. Williams:

This office has been retained to represent Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard with respect to their employment claims against Stone & Youngberg, arising from their abrupt termination without cause on or about October 7, 2005.

We have reviewed the proposed "Departure Agreement and Release" proffered to both Ms. Molnar and Ms. Shepard shortly after their termination. Essentially, these Agreements offer to pay each of them (a) a portion of the bonus previously guaranteed to them for 2005, and (b) a part of the remainder of the bonus, now called "additional consideration," in order to obtain a release of all claims against Stone & Youngberg. We believe this severance offer is woefully inadequate, because it not only reneges on the terms of their employment agreements, but also ignores the pattern of discrimination based on sex and/or pregnancy committed by Stone & Youngberg against them.

#### **FACTS**

#### A. Patricia Shepard.

Ms. Shepard was originally promised a position as a Managing Director at Stone & Youngberg (S&Y) with an equity share and guaranteed salary and bonus. However, when funding occurred in July 2004, she was presented with an Offer Letter hiring her as a Principal, without equity. She was told only Managing Directors were entitled to equity. She had previously turned down a better position with Citibank at

higher compensation, in reliance on the Managing Director offer. complained about this lower position, and was finally made a Managing Director in January 2005, but without equity.

In July 2005, Ms. Shepard left on maternity Leave of Absence, after being told that she had only 6 weeks of disability leave at 60% of pay. She was then pressured to. return to work after only 5 weeks.

In September 2005, Ms. Shepard was advised that S & Y Asset Management was being spun off from S & Y. She was assured that her employment with S&Y and S&Y Asset Management would continue until the spin-off at year-end. She was also told that, as one of the "producers" with direct client responsibility, her position would not be eliminated. After purchasing a new home in reliance on these representations, she was told on October 7, 2005 she was terminated without cause. Ms. Shepard was apparently the only producer terminated as part of this spin-off, while virtually all male producers were retained.

We have recently learned that Ms. Shepard's termination was part of an overall pattern of sex discrimination against women in employment, particularly with respect to salary and benefits. With respect to salary, we have evidence that several men with less experience and qualifications than Ms. Shepard were employed as Principals and Managing Directors for S & Y and paid between \$50,000 and \$75,000 per year in total compensation more than she was. Contrary to Management's representations to her, even male Principals and Vice Presidents were given equity shares. With respect to disability leave, we have learned that a man employed by S & Y was recently granted paternity leave with full pay, not the 60% of compensation she received.

#### В. Catherine Molnar.

Ms. Molnar's treatment was even more egregious. She was hired in October 2004 as a Managing Director of S & Y Asset Management, while she was living in Massachusetts. Management insisted that she sell her family business there, as well as her home. Ms. Molnar commuted for months to California, until approximately April 30, 2005, when her doctor restricted her from flying because of her pregnancy. From May 1, 2005 until June 21, 2005, when she gave birth, she continued to work fulltime from home. She commenced a disability leave, continuing to work part-time from home, and received disability benefits at 60% of pay for approximately 3 months until mid-September, 2005, when S & Y stopped paying her without explanation.

Management derided her leave as "vacation", even though she had been working steadily from home. The Departure Agreement confirms this attitude, by proposing to reduce her bonus because of her maternity leave.

At the time she was hired by S & Y, Management promised Ms. Molnar that in return for moving to California, S & Y would make up any loss on the sale of her family business up to \$100,000. Management also promised to guarantee her salary and bonus through December 2005. In September 2005, even while S & Y was actively negotiating to eliminate her job, Management continued to press Ms. Molnar to come back from disability leave, sell her family business and move to California as soon as possible. She was similarly assured she would continue to be employed by S&Y through December 2005, when funding for the spin-off was expected. At Management's behest, Ms. Molnar expedited the sale, thus losing the income that would be generated by the bakery's holiday sales. Two days after she closed the sale, S & Y told her she would be terminated without cause. Management has now advised her it will not honor its contractual obligations to pay for the losses on the sale of her business, and repudiated its guarantee of salary and bonus through December 2005.

Like Ms. Shepard, Ms. Molnar also suffered substantial economic losses from the discriminatory salary and benefits structure of S & Y. Although Ms. Molnar was a Managing Director, she has recently learned that several men at S & Y with equal or less qualifications and experience were paid \$50,000 to \$75,000 more per year in salary and guaranteed bonus than she was. Even the male Principal who reported to her was paid \$25,000/yr. more than she. She also suffered from the same discriminatory policy regarding reduced compensation for maternity leave.

#### DAMAGES

We think the above evidence is sufficient to prove claims for sex discrimination in salary and benefits with regard to Ms. Shepard and Ms. Molnar, as well as wrongful termination based on sex, pregnancy and/or disability leave. In addition, we believe there is substantial evidence to support a claim by Ms. Molnar for fraudulent inducement to move to California, entitling her and her spouse to double damages under-California Labor Code Section 970. Further, Ms. Molnar and Ms. Shepard have contractual claims for lost salary, bonus and equity under the terms of their Offer Letters.

#### A. Bonus.

Under the Offer Letters, Ms. Shepard was entitled to a guaranteed bonus of \$55,000/yr. through December 2005. Ms. Molnar was guaranteed a bonus of \$60,000/yr. through December 2005. The Departure Agreement repudiates both.

#### B. Lost Salary.

As indicated above, Ms. Shepard was paid approximately \$50,000 to \$75,000 less per year in total compensation than equal or lesser-qualified males employed by S & Y. Ms. Molnar suffered approximately the same loss of total compensation. In addition, because S & Y has now terminated them, we believe it must also bear responsibility for the salary, bonus and other income both will lose until they can obtain equivalent employment. We expect it will require at least 6 to 12 months for each of them to attain the same level of total compensation they would have earned at S & Y. Their termination stripped them of their client base and destroyed their credibility with clients, so each will have to begin anew.

#### C. Other Damages.

As you know, if we prevail on Ms. Shepard's and Ms. Molnar's claims of sex and/or disability discrimination, each of them would be entitled to damages under both Federal and State law, including back pay, front pay, liquidated damages, emotional distress damages, potential punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. In an effort to resolve this matter confidentially and expeditiously, our settlement proposal makes no claim for non-economic damages, such as for emotional distress. However, be assured this will be a substantial component of damages should this matter proceed to litigation. Ms. Shepard's abrupt and unexplained termination, coming shortly after her pregnancy and her purchase of a home in reliance on the security of her position, has caused her severe distress, emotional upset and acute embarrassment, not only with respect to coemployees, but especially with her clients and prospective clients, now stripped from her by S & Y: It has caused extreme anxiety regarding her medical coverage for herself and her new family. It has wiped away almost two years of work and relationship building, some of which can never be re-built.

With respect to Ms. Molnar, the emotional distress damages are even more severe. She was maliciously compelled to sell her family business at a loss of approximately \$150,000, including capital and income loss, and her husband has been deprived of future income from the business he worked several years to build. They have also been compelled to sell their home at a substantial loss in order for Ms. Molnar to salvage her career here in California. In addition, Ms. Molnar is still suffering from a serious and potentially life-threatening disability resulting from her pregnancy, so that the loss of medical coverage for herself and her baby has been devastating. Both she and her husband are now without income and unable to afford adequate substitute medical coverage.

SETTLEMENT DEMAND

Please direct all further communications to the undersigned. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Geoffrey V. White

GVW/mc

cc:

Catherine Molnar

Patricia Shepard

## **EXHIBIT 2**

yould be reduced because of my disability. During the same spinoff, 1 out of 4 professional women, or 5%, were retained while 7 out of 10 men, or 70 %, were retained. The three women laid off were more ualified and experienced than several of the men retained.			
Respondent did not give a reason for its discriminato	ry actions.		
rant this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any. I will vise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully h them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures.	NOTARY – When necessary for State and Local Agency Requirements  RFCEIVED		
eclare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.	I swear or affirm that I have read the above charge and that it is true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief 19 2005		
12-15-05 X Advine a Loluar  Date Charging Party Signature	SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE METEROC - SFDO (month, day, year)		
	EXHIBIT 2		

advise the agencies if I chan with them in the processing of	noth the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any. I will ge my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully of my charge in accordance with their procedures.
I declare under penalty of	perjury that the above is true and correct.
× 12 · 15 · 05  Date	Charging Party Signature

I swear or affirm that I have read the above charge and that it is true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS DATE (month, day, year)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION	Charge Pro	esented To: Age	ncy(ies) Charge No(s):
This form is a ffected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See enclosed Privacy Act Statement and other information before completing this form.		FEPA	
Statement and on a mioritation before completing this form.	X	EEOC ;	370-2006-00453
California Department Of Fair		& Housing	and EEOC
Name (Indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.)	cy, if any	Home Phone No. (Incl Are	a Code) Date of Birth
Ms. Patricia Shepard			
•	and ZIP Code		
19 Underhill Rd., Mill Valley, CA 94941  Named is the Employer, Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticesh		ate or Local Government A	gency That I Believe
Discriminated Against Me or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULAR  Name	S below.)	No. Employees, Members	Phone No. (Include Area Code)
S AND Y ASSET MANAGMENT		201 - 500	(415) 445-2300
Street Address City, State	and ZIP Code		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 Ferry Building, San Francisco, CA 94111			
Name		No. Employees, Members	Phone No. (Include Area Code)
S AND Y MANAGEMENT Street Address City. State	and ZIP Code	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
1 Ferry Bldg., San Francisco, CA 94111	and En Code		
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es).)		DATE(S) DISCRIMINA Earliest	TION TOOK PLACE Latest
RACE COLOR X SEX RELIGION	NATIONAL ORIGI		
X RETALIATION AGE DISABILITY OTH	ER (Specify below.)	Į.	10-7-2005
		CONTIN	IUING ACTION
I began working for Respondent on July 19, 2004. My the last week of February, 2005, I became aware that me substantially more than I did even though most had equivariately more than I did even though most had equivariately more than I was accompensation (which Joe Piazza, President, Stone and promised me and which I did not receive). In May, 200 Robin Makao, CFO, and Cherie Larson, Human Resour being below the industry standard. In August, 2005, I was advised that S & Y Asset Management was was abruptly terminated without cause despite my exception of the three women laid off were more qualified retained. The three women laid off were more qualified retained.  Respondent did not give a reason for its discriminator. I believe that I have been discriminated against on the	nale Managing ual or lesser vas and had a I Youngberg / 5, Catherine Noces, about Resook a matern being spun of ellent work poetained while d and experient	g Directors at SYAI qualifications and an equity share as Asset Management Molnar and I spoke espondent's mater ity Leave of Absert of from S & Y. On erformance. Durin 7 out of 10 men, onced than several	M made experience. I also part of their t, originally to Mr. Piazza, nity leave policy nce. In September October 7, 2005, I ng the same or 70 %, were of the men
pregnancy, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights A	ct of 1964, as		elieve that a class
advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures.			^=
	I swear or affirm tha the best of my know SIGNATURE OF COM	at I have read the and selected on the land selecte	C 1 3 2005
12/13/05 / Cell Magare  Charging Party Signature	SUBSCRIBED AND S'	WORN TO BEFORE EE	C-SFDO

. 'E	Case3:08-cv-04392-WHA	Document2-2	Filed09/18/08	Page27 of 72
##00 Form 5 (5/04)				

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION	Charge Presented To:	Agency(ies) Charge No(s):			
This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See enclosed Privacy Act Statement and other information before completing this form.	FEPA				
	X EEOC	370-2006-00453			
California Department Of Fair Em		and EEOC			
State or local Agency, if THE PARTICULARS ARE (Continued from previous page):	any				
of women has been discriminated against in violation of the statute. I also believe that I have been					
retaliated against in violation of the statute.					
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I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any. I will NO	OTARY - When necessary for State and L	ocal Agency Requirements			
advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures.					
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.	swear or affirm that I have read the a e best of my knowledge, information	bove charge and that it is true to and belief.			
	GNATURE OF COMPLAINANT	<u>.</u>			
alala to la Chamera SI	JBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE	ME THIS DATE			
Date Charging Party Signature (m	norith, day, year)				

# EXHIBIT 3



OF

### **GEOFFREY V. WHITE**

351 CALIFORNIA STREET, SUITE 1500 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104-2407 TEL: (415) 362-5658 FAX: (415) 362-4115



May 23, 2006

#### PRIVILEGED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION

Joseph J. Piazza 240 Madrona Avenue Belvedere, CA 94920

Re Shepard & Molnar v. Stone & Youngberg et al.

Dear Mr. Piazza:

As you may be aware, this office has been retained to represent Patricia Shepard and Catherine Molnar regarding their employment claims against Stone & Youngberg and S&Y Asset Management, arising from their abrupt termination without cause on or about October 7, 2005.

Briefly stated, these claims include claims for damages (1) under their employment agreements; (2) for sex discrimination in their wages, benefits and termination; and (3) for fraud in inducing Ms. Molnar to sell her business and move to San Francisco. A more detailed statement is in my letter to S&Y's counsel, dated November 23, 2005, a copy of which is enclosed. The matter is now being investigated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in San Francisco.

Based on certain information provided to us, it appears that Stone & Youngberg may take the position certain of your actions on behalf of S&Y Asset Management were either unauthorized or beyond the scope of your employment. In that event, of course, S&Y may claim no legal obligation to defend or indemnify you, and we may be compelled to seek legal recourse against you personally.

Of course, we would prefer to resolve this matter privately with all responsible parties. S&Y has agreed to private mediation, and we are hopeful the EEOC will also agree to participate. However, S&Y's likely position, as indicated above, may make the mediation unsuccessful without your assistance in clarifying S&Y's instructions, knowledge, or ratification of these actions.

Joseph J. Piazza May 23, 2006 Page 2

I would appreciate it if you would telephone me, or have your legal counsel telephone me, to discuss this further at your earliest convenience. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Geoffrey V. White

GVW/mc

Enclosure

cc:

(w/o encl.)

Patricia Shepard Catherine Molner

# **EXHIBIT 4**



## U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION San Francisco District Office 350 The

350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 625-5600 TTY (415) 625-5610 FAX (415) 625-5609

Charge Numbers 370-2006-00462 & 370-2006-00457

Catherine Molnar 288 Essex St. S Hamilton, MA 01982 Charging Party

RECEIVED

SEP 1 9 2006

S and Y Asset Management Stone and Youngberg, LLP 1 Ferry Bldg. San Francisco, CA 94111

Respondent

#### **DETERMINATION**

Under the authority vested in me by the Commission, I issue the following determination as to the merits of the charges filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. All jurisdictional requirements have been met.

The Charging Party alleges that she was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment and discharged. The Charging Party also alleges that she was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Respondent denies Charging Party's allegations.

Evidence indicates that Charging Party was discriminated against because of her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discriminated against because of their sex, Female, when they were subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. Evidence also indicates that Charging Party was discharged because of her sex, Female. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discharged because of their sex, Female. Evidence also indicates that Charging Party was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Letter of Determination
Page Two
EEOC Charge #s 370-2006-00462 & 370-2006-00457

Based upon the record of evidence, I have determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Charging Party was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. I have also determined that there is reasonable cause to believe a class of similarly situated female employees were discriminated against because of their sex, Female, when they were subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. I have also determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Chargign Party was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was discharged. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discharged because of their sex, Female. I have also determined that Charging Party was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Based upon the Commission's investigation, the Commission is unable to conclude that the information obtained regarding disability discrimination establishes a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended. This does not certify that the Respondent is in compliance with the statute.

Section 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), requires that if the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, it shall endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Having determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, the Commission now invites the parties to join with it in a collective effort toward a just resolution of this matter.

A representative of the Commission will contact you in the near future to begin the conciliation process. Disclosure of information obtained by the Commission during the conciliation process will be made only in accordance with Section 706(b) of Title VII and Section 1601.26 of the Commission's Procedural Regulations. When the Respondent declines to enter into settlement discussions, or when the Commission's representative for any other reason is unable to secure a settlement acceptable to the Office Director, the Director shall so inform the parties in writing.

You are reminded that Federal Law prohibits retaliation against persons who have exercised their right to inquire or complain about matters they believe may violate the law. Discrimination against persons who have cooperated in Commission investigations is also prohibited. These protections apply regardless of the Commission's determination on the merits of the charge.

On Behalf of the Commission:

DATE

H. Joan Ehrlich

District Director



## U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION San Francisco District Office 350 The

350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 625-5600 TTY (415) 625-5610 FAX (415) 625-5609

Charge Numbers 370-2006-00461 & 370-2006-00453

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Patricia Shepard 19 Underhill Rd. Mill Valley, CA 94941 **Charging Party** 

SEP 1 9 2006

S and Y Asset Management Stone and Youngberg, LLP 1 Ferry Bldg. San Francisco, CA 94111 Respondent

#### **DETERMINATION**

Under the authority vested in me by the Commission, I issue the following determination as to the merits of the charges filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. All jurisdictional requirements have been met.

The Charging Party alleges that she was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment and discharged. The Charging Party also alleges that she was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Respondent denies Charging Party's allegations.

Evidence indicates that Charging Party was discriminated against because of her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discriminated against because of their sex, Female, when they were subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. Evidence also indicates that Charging Party was discharged because of her sex, Female. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discharged because of their sex, Female. Evidence also indicates that Charging Party was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Letter of Determination
Page Two
EEOC Charge #s 370-2006-00461 & 370-2006-00453

Based upon the record of evidence, I have determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Charging Party was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. I have also determined that there is reasonable cause to believe a class of similarly situated female employees were discriminated against because of their sex, Female, when they were subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment. I have also determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Charging Party was discriminated against based on her sex, Female, when she was discharged. The evidence also indicates that a class of similarly situated female employees were discharged because of their sex, Female. I have also determined that Charging Party was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity when she was discharged.

Section 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), requires that if the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, it shall endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Having determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, the Commission now invites the parties to join with it in a collective effort toward a just resolution of this matter.

A representative of the Commission will contact you in the near future to begin the conciliation process. Disclosure of information obtained by the Commission during the conciliation process will be made only in accordance with Section 706(b) of Title VII and Section 1601.26 of the Commission's Procedural Regulations. When the Respondent declines to enter into settlement discussions, or when the Commission's representative for any other reason is unable to secure a settlement acceptable to the Office Director, the Director shall so inform the parties in writing.

You are reminded that Federal Law prohibits retaliation against persons who have exercised their right to inquire or complain about matters they believe may violate the law. Discrimination against persons who have cooperated in Commission investigations is also prohibited. These protections apply regardless of the Commission's determination on the merits of the charge.

On Behalf of the Commission:

DATE

H. Joan Ehrlich
District Director

# **EXHIBIT 5**



# U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION San Francisco District Office

RECEIVED

FEB - 8 2007

350 The Embarcadero, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94105-1260 Tel.(415) 625-5600 Toll Free: (800) 669-4000

> Stone and Youngberg, LLP S and Y Asset Management c/o Mike Lucey Gordon & Rees, LLP 275 Battery St., Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111

> > Re: Patricia Shepard vs. S and Y Asset Management and Stone and Youngerg,

EEOC Charges Nos. 370-2006-00453 and 370-2006-00461

Catherine Molnar vs. S and Y Asset Management and Stone and Youngberg,

EEOC Charge Nos. 370-2006-00462 and 370-2006-00457

Pursuant to the authority vested in the District Director by 29 CFR §1601.21(b) & (d), I am hereby revoking the Letters of Determination previously issued on the above referenced charges and reopening said charges for further investigation.

Dated:

H. Joan Ehrlich, District Director

Deputy Clerk

BAEVX

ŀ MICHAEL T. LUCEY (SBN: 099927) MICHAEL A. LAURENSON (SBN: 190023) 2 MARCIE S. ISOM (SBN: 226906) GORDON & REES LLP FEB 0 4 2008 3 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054 WESLEY RAMIREZ 5 Attorneys for Defendants 6 S&Y MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE & YOUNGBERG, LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM LOCKARD 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8 9 CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA CASE NO. CGC-07-467639 10 SHEPARD, 11 **DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN** Plaintiffs, SUPPORT OF DEMURRER 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 12 San Francisco, CA 94111 Date: February 11, 2008 VS. Gordon & Rees LLP 13 Time: 9:30 a.m. S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, et al., Dept: 301 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiffs argue that their cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 970 is not 17 untimely because the statute of limitations is either two or three years and/or because they are 18 entitled to equitable tolling during the time they have been pursing their remedies with the 19 EEOC. However, the cases upon which plaintiffs rely do not support these arguments. The only 20 published cases on the issue hold that the statute of limitations is one year, and equitable tolling 21 has been held not to apply to toll the statute of limitations for an independent harm while a 22 plaintiff pursues an alternative administrative process. Accordingly, defendants' demurrer 23 should be sustained without leave to amend. 24 25 II. RELEVANT FACTS It is alleged in the Complaint and not disputed that plaintiffs were terminated on October 26 7, 2005, but did not file the instant lawsuit until nearly two years later, on September 27, 2007. 27 28

DEF.'S REPLY BRIEF I.S.O. DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

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In opposition, plaintiffs offer by way of attorney declaration, that they wrote a demand letter to defendants on October 31, 2005, putting them on notice of a claim for violation of Labor Code section 970, and that they both filed charges with the EEOC in December 2005 which are still pending. Assuming for the sake of argument that the court may consider these unpled facts on this motion on the pleadings, they do not serve to revive plaintiffs' untimely claim.

#### Ш. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

#### The Statute of Limitations is One Year

Admittedly, there is a dearth of published authority on this point. Nevertheless, the only available published authority holds that the proper statute of limitations is the one-year period provided for liability based on statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1

In Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1010, 1018, the Ninth Circuit, citing a California case, Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1984) 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 980, "assume[d] the correctness of the district court conclusion" that the plaintiffs' "statutory claim under § 970 ... [was] governed by the one year statute of limitations found in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340." In Munoz, the court wrote of "the one-year statute of limitations applicable to both [Labor Code] sections 971 and 972 (see Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (1)) ...." (156 Cal, App. 3d at 980.) Plaintiffs make no attempt to dispute or distinguish these decisions, which are both still good law; they simply ignore them.

The cases plaintiffs do cite do not address the statute of limitations. They do, however, refer to Labor Code section 970 as a "statutory tort cause of action," which would support the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 340(a) for "[a]n action upon a statute ...." (Burden v. County of Santa Clara (2000) 81 Cal, App. 4th 244, 253 [emphasis added].)

Thus, this Court is presented, on the one hand, with cases which hold or assume that the statute of limitations is one year, and, on the other hand, argument by plaintiffs, which is not

Plaintiffs mistakenly chastise defendants for "fail[ing] to point out to the Court that Cal. Code Civ. Pro. Section 340(a) was amended in 2002, to enlarge the applicable statute of limitations to a minimum of 2 years." (Plaintiff's Opposition, 2:8-9.) It was the personal injury statute of limitations, now found at section 335.1, that was increased from one to two years in 2002. (Stats.2002, c. 448 (S.B.688), § 3.) The limitations period for an action based on statute was one year prior to this amendment, and remains one year.

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supported by any case law, that it should be longer. Clearly, the former is more persuasive, and this Court should find that the statute of limitations is one year. Therefore, because plaintiffs did not file the instant lawsuit until almost two years after their terminations, their section 970 claims are untimely, absent equitable tolling, which, as demonstrated below, does not apply here.

#### B. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply Here

Plaintiffs, themselves critical of defendants' reliance on "only one California case from 1984" concerning the statute of limitations, here correctly recite the history of the doctrine of equitable tolling as it was established by the case law up through 1980. However, more recent cases make clear that the doctrine has no application here, where a plaintiff is pursuing an independent, alternative administrative process.

In Mathieu v. Norrell (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, the plaintiff sued her former employer for sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA, and for tortious wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The defendants were granted summary adjudication on her tort claim on the ground it was barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued on appeal that it was timely based on equitable tolling because she had filed an earlier charge with the DFEH. The appellate court wrote that "[the plaintiff's] tolling argument is not supported by any reported California case." (115 Cal.App.4th at 1189.) Following its review of the case law, the court wrote:

> Recognizing equitable tolling in the context of concurrent state and federal administrative proceedings preceding a statutory claim under the FEHA, however, is far different from permitting a plaintiff to delay filing a common law tort action because an alternative administrative process has not yet been completed. We decline to extend the ruling of [Downs v. Department of Water & Power (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1100 to the current situation, as to which its rationale is simply inapplicable. Summary adjudication was properly granted as to Mathieu's wrongful termination claim.

(Id. at 1190.) The Mathieu court also cited to a case from the Northern District of California, Burmeister v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1999) 1999 WL 111890, which came to the same result. Indeed, in Burmeister, the plaintiff made essentially the same argument in support of equitable tolling as plaintiffs make in the instant case, arguing that:

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275 Battery Street, Suite 2006 San Francisco, CA 94111 Gordon & Rees LLP 15 18 22

[T]he doctrine of "equitable tolling" should toll [her] common law wrongful termination/public policy claim. In particular, she argues that since her wrongful termination claim arises out of the same facts as her FEHA claims it would make no sense for her to file her wrongful termination claim within one year of her termination and then later file her FEHA claim after the administrative process is over and she has been given her right-to-sue notice. She concludes that since her FEHA claim is timely filed her wrongful termination claim should be deemed timely filed as well.

(1999 WL 111890, \*1.) The Burmeister court "conclude[d] that as a matter of law equitable tolling does not apply here," failing to find, as had Mathieu, "any California case which suggests that the California courts would recognize equitable tolling under such circumstances." (Id. at \*2.)

While both *Mathieu* and *Burmeister* involved tort claims and an administrative charge. there is no reason why the analysis would be any different with plaintiffs' statutory claims for violation of Labor Code section 970. Plaintiffs' pursuit of EEOC remedies for their alleged discriminatory discharge is an "alternative administrative process" which is entirely independent from their "statutory tort" claim that they were fraudulently lured to accept their jobs in the first place.

Even the cases upon which plaintiffs rely require the same outcome. The cases of *Elkins*, Addison and Collier, all cited by plaintiffs, were collected and summarized in Downs v. Department of Water & Power (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1100, where the court then provided a three-factor test to "determine whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled in a particular case: (1) timely notice to defendants in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendants in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by plaintiffs in filing the second claim."

Here, plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first factor, because the only claims that they have "filed"—their EEOC charges—do not provide timely notice to defendants of the facts in support of the Labor Code section 970 claim. They also cannot satisfy the second factor, which "essentially translates to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so similar that the defendant's investigation of the first claim will put him in a position to fairly defend the second." (Downs, 58 Cal.App.4th at 1100.) Here, plaintiffs' EEOC charges, which

only allege facts related to their discrimination claims, are totally independent from and unrelated to their claims that they were fraudulently lured to accept their jobs in the first place, and an investigation of their alleged discriminatory terminations will not put defendants in a position to fairly defend against their fraud claims, which depend only upon defendants' knowledge and representations at the time of their hiring.

### IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Because plaintiffs' Labor Code section 970 claims were not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations and are not saved by the doctrine of equitable tolling based on their pursuit of alternative remedies with the EEOC, defendants' demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend and plaintiffs' fifth cause of action dismissed from the Complaint.

Dated: February 4, 2008

GORDON & REES LLP

MICHAEL LAURENSON

Attorneys for Defendants

S&Y MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE &

YOUNGBERG, LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM

LOCKARD

Gordon & Rees LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA. 94111

San Francis 

MNTR/1042859/5333880v.1

#### PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Gordon & Rees LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000, San Francisco, CA 94111. On February 4, 2008, I served the within documents:

### DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER

	by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) see forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.
--	---

- by personally delivering the document(s) listed above via Docket Rocket to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
  - by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in United States mail in the State of California at San Francisco, addressed as set forth below.
  - by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, at a station designated for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight delivery by FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon & Rees LLP described below, addressed as follows:

Geoffrey V. White Law Office of Geoffrey V. White 351 California Street, Suite 1500 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 362-5658 Facsimile: (415) 362-4115

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on February 4, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

Karen Sheehy

Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard v. Stone & Youngberg, et al. Case No. CGC-07-467639

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275 Battery Street, Suite 2000

Gordon & Rees LLP

San Francisco, CA 94111

Case3:08-cv-04392-WHA Document2-2 Filed09/18/08

To-GORDON & REES, LLP 4 Page 002

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Received Feb-11-08 02:15pm

Gordon & Rees

2/11/2008 1:51 PAGE 002/002 Fax Server

	1	1 MICHAEL T. LUCEY (SBN: 099927) MICHAEL A. LAURENSON (SBN: 190023)					
	2	2    MARCIE S. ISOM (SBN: 226906)					
	3						
	4	San Francisco, CA 94111   Telephone: (415) 986-5900					
	5	Facsimile: (415) 986-8054					
		Attorneys for Defendants	. Potatoneno				
	6	sæy asset management llc; stone & youngberg, llc; joseph piazza; tom lockard					
	7	CTINEDIOD COURT OF CALIFORNIA COURTS OF CAN ED ANCIOCO					
	B	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO					
	9	·					
	10	CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA SHEPARD.	CASE NO. CGC-07-467639				
	11	Plaintiffs.	(PROPOSED) ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER				
8 =	12	,	) DEMURRER )				
ulfe 20	13	V8.	}				
<b>2</b> 2	14	S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,	}				
y Star	15	Defendants.	}				
275 Buttery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111	16	Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for violation of Labor Code					
27.5	17	Section 970 came on regularly before this Court for hearing on February 11, 2008, at 9:30 a.m.,					
	18	in Department 301. Michael Laurenson appeared for defendants and moving parties. Geoffrey					
	19	White appeared for plaintiffs. The Court having read the papers submitted in support of and in					
	20	opposition to said motion and having considered the arguments of counsel, and on good cause					
	21	appearing therefor,					
	22	IT IS HERBBY ORDERED that defendants' demurrer is sustained with 10 days leave to					
	23	amend to plead facts establishing tolling of the one-year statute of limitations, if plaintiffs can do					
	24	se in good faith.					
	25	Dated:, 2008	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT				
	26	Approved as to Form:					
	27	V. wille					
	28	Attorney for Plaintiffs					
		-1-					
		ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639					

.

	GM-110			
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Sat number, and address):	FOR COURT USE ONLY			
Michael T. Lucey (99927) Michael A. Laurenson (190023)				
Gordon & Rees LLP				
275 Battery Street, 20th Floor				
San Francisco, CA 94111				
TELEPHONE NO.: (415) 986-5900 FAX NO. (Optional): (415) 986-8054	<u>Par</u>			
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):	ENDORSED			
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Defendants Stone & Younberg, et al.	San Francisco County Superior Court			
SUPERIOR.COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Francisco	County Superior Court			
STREET ADDRESS;	0 % /III)k			
MA)LING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE:	GORDON PADIS			
BRANCH NAME:	GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk			
	GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk PERNADETTE THOMPSON Deputy Clerk			
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard	Deputy Clerk			
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Stone & Younberg, et al.				
. CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT	CASE NILI MIBER:			
(Check one):  UNLIMITED CASE   LIMITED CASE	CGC-O7-467639			
(Amount demanded (Amount demanded is \$25,000	·			
exceeds \$25,000) or less)				
A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE is scheduled as follows:				
<b> </b>	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			
	iv.: Room:			
Address of court (if different from the address above):				
INCEDIOTIONS				
INSTRUCTIONS: All applicable boxes must be checked, and the specified	information must be provided.			
1. Party or parties (answer one):				
a. 🗵 This statement is submitted by party (name): Defendants Stone & Younberg, et: al.				
b. This statement is submitted jointly by parties (names):				
· ·				
2. Complaint and cross-complaint (to be asswered by plaintiffs, and cross-complainable	is only)			
<ol> <li>Complaint and cross-complaint (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainant         a. The.complaint was filed on (date):</li> </ol>	s only)			
b. The cross-complaint, if any, was filed on (date):	्री पञ्च			
	en En la serie			
3. Service (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainents only)	ीम-प्रदर्श			
a. All parties named in the complaint and cross-complaint have been served,	or have appeared, or have been dismissed.			
b. The following parties named in the complaint or cross-complaint				
(1) have not been served (specify names and explain why not):				
	H. J. C. and Managements			
(4) Light have been served but have not appeared and have not been	(2) have been served but have not appeared and have not been dismissed (specify names):			
(3) have had a default entered against them (specify names):				
(3) have had a default entered against them (specify names):				
<ul> <li>(3)  have had a default entered against them (specify names):</li> <li>c.  The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):</li> </ul>	volvemsant in case, and the date by which			
c. The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):	ydvemeant in case, and the date by which			
c. The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):  4. Description of case				
<ul> <li>c.  The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):</li> <li>4. Description of case</li> <li>a. Type of case in  complaint  cross-complaint (describe, in</li> </ul>	volvemeant in case, and the date by which cluding causes of action):			
c. The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):  4. Description of case				

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of Catifornia CM-110 [Rov. January 1, 2007]

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

Page 1 of 4 Cal Rules of Court, rules 3.720-3.730 www.courtinlo.co.gov

Americao LegalNet, Inc. www.FormsWorkflow.com

CM-110

	PLANTIFF/PETITIONER: Molnar et al.	CASE NUMBER.
	DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: S & Y Asset Management et al.	CGC-07-467639
4	4. b. Provide a brief statement of the case, including any damages. (If personal injury damages claimed, including medical expenses to date [indicate source and amou earnings to date, and estimated future lost earnings. If equitable relief is sought, and Plaintiffs are former financial advisors of Defendan Plaintiffs were induced to move their residences by then laid offi Plaintiffs allege their pay and bene that their termination was in breach of contract, in public policy, and discriminatory.	unt], estimated future medical expenses, lost describe the nature of the relief.) It financial services company. Defendants' false promises, fits were discriminatory, and
		•
	(If more space is needed, check this box and attach a page designated as Atta	ochment 4h )
_		·
5.		an one party, provide the name of each party
	requesting a jury train.	
^	The state of the s	
6.	<ul> <li>Trial date</li> <li>a. The trial has been set for (date):</li> <li>b. XX No trial date has been set. This case will be ready for trial within 12 months not, explain):</li> </ul>	of the date of the filing of the complaint (if
	c. Dates on which parties or attorneys will not be available for trial (specify dates and	l explain reasons for unavailability):
7.	Estimated length of trial  The party or parties estimate that the trial will take (check one):  a. XX days (specify number): 10 days  b. hours (short causes) (specify):	
8.	Trial representation (to be answered for each party)  The party or parties will be represented at trial XX by the attorney or party listed in a. Attorney:  b. Firm:	the caption by the following:
	c. Address:	•
	d. Telephone number: e. Fax number:	
	f. E-mail address:	
	g. Party represented:	
	Additional representation is described in Attachment 8.	
9.	Preference  This case is entitled to preference (specify code section):	
10	Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)	
	a. Counsel XX has  has not provided the ADR information package ide reviewed ADR options with the client.	entified in rule 3.221 to the client and has
	b. All parties have agreed to a form of ADR. ADR will be completed by (date):	•
	c. XX The case has gone to an ADR process (indicate status): Mediation in JAMS Mediator Ho	November 2006 before n. William Cahill (Ret.)

Case3:08-cv-043 Document2-2 Filed09/18 Page53 of 72 CM-110 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Molnar et al. CGC-07-467639 S & Y Asset Management et al. DEFEN DANT/RESPONDENT: 10. d. The party or parties are willing to participate in (check all that apply): (1) Mediation **(**2) Nonbinding judicial arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.12 (discovery to close 15 days before arbitration under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.822) Nonbinding judicial arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.12 (discovery to remain open until 30 days **(**3) before trial; order required under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.822) (4) Binding judicial arbitration (5)Binding private arbitration (6)Neutral case evaluation Other (specify): This matter is subject to mandatory judicial arbitration because the amount in controversy does not exceed the statutory limit. Plaintiff elects to refer this case to judicial arbitration and agrees to limit recovery to the amount specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.11. This case is exempt from judicial arbitration under rule 3.811 of the California Rules of Court (specify exemption): 11. Settlement conference The party or parties are willing to participate in an early settlement conference (specify when): 12. Insurance a. Insurance carrier, if any, for party filing this statement (name): Reservation of rights: Yes No Coverage issues will significantly affect resolution of this case (explain): 13. Jurisdiction Indicate any matters that may affect the court's jurisdiction or processing of this case, and describe the status. Other (specify) pending EEOC investigation; Bankruptcy Status: Expecting Right-to-Sue letter after determination. 14. Related cases, consolidation, and coordination There are companion, underlying, or related cases. (1) Name of case: (2) Name of court: (3) Case number: (4) Status: Additional cases are described in Attachment 14a. A motion to consolidate coordinate will be filed by (name party): 15. Bifurcation The party or parties intend to file a motion for an order bifurcating, severing, or coordinating the following issues or causes of action (specify moving party, type of motion, and reasons): 16. Other motions The party or parties expect to file the following motions before trial (specify moving party, type of motion, and issues):

CM-110 CASE NUMBER: PLA.INTIFF/PETITIONER: Molnar et al. CGC-07-467639 S & Y Asset Management et al. DEFEND ANT/RESPONDENT: 17. Discovery a. \_\_\_\_ The party or parties have completed all discovery. b. XX The following discovery will be completed by the date specified (describe all anticipated discovery): <u>Description</u>
Requests for Production <u>Date</u> May 2008 Plaintiffs July 2008 Defendants' Depositions Plaintiffs November 2008 Expert Discovery Plaintiffs The following discovery issues are anticipated (specify): 18. Economic Litigation This is a limited civil case (i.e., the amount demanded is \$25,000 or less) and the economic litigation procedures in Code of Civil Procedure sections 90 through 98 will apply to this case. This is a limited civil case and a motion to withdraw the case from the economic litigation procedures or for additional discovery will be filed (if checked, explain specifically why economic litigation procedures relating to discovery or trial should not apply to this case): 19. Other issues The party or parties request that the following additional matters be considered or determined at the case management Plaintiffs will amend to add statutory claims for emphoyment conference (specify): discriminations after EEOC investigation is concluded. 20. Meet and confer a. XX The party or parties have met and conferred with all parties on all subjects required by rule 3.724 of the California Rules of Court (if not, explain): b. After meeting and conferring as required by rule 3.724 of the California Rules of Court, the parties agree on the following (specify): 21. Case management orders XX none attached as Attachment 21. Previous case management orders in this case are (check one): 22. Total number of pages attached (if any): I am completely familiar with this case and will be fully prepared to discuss the status of discovery and ADR, as well as other issues raised by this statement, and will possess the authority to enter into stipulations on these issues at the time of the case management conference, including the written authority of the party where required. Date: February 5, 2008 Geoffrey V. White (TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

(SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY)

Additional signatures are attached

#### PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Law Office of Geoffrey V. White, 351 California Street, San Francisco, CA 94104-2407. On February 5, 2008, I served the within

## CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail in the State of California at San Francisco, addressed as set forth below.

Michael T. Lucey Gordon & Rees 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice and collection of processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on February 5, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

Maxine Clamage

Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard v. Stone & Youngberg, et al. Case No. CGC-07-467639

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documents:

Proof of Service

400 MCALLISTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

CATHERINE MOLNAR et al

Pretrial Department 212
Case Management Order

PLAINTIFF (S)

VS.

NO. CGC-07-467639

S & Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION et al

Order Continuing Case Management Conference

DEFENDANT (S)

TO: ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES IN PROPRIA PERSONA

The FEB-29-2008 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE is canceled, and it is hereby ordered:

This case is set for a case management conference on APR-11-2008 in Department 212 at 9:00 AM.

CRC 3.725 requires the filing and service of a case management statement form CM-110 no later than fifteen (15) days before the case management conference. However, it would facilitate the issuance of a case management order without an appearance at the case management conference if the case management statement is filed, served and lodged in Department 212 twenty-five (25) days before the case management conference.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL OR PLAINTIFF(S) IN PROPRIA PERSONA must send a copy of this notice to all parties not listed on the attached proof of service within five (5) days of the date of this order.

DATED: FEB-20-2008

ARLENE T. BORICK

JUDGE/COMMISSIONER

ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

275 Battery Street, Suite 2000

MNTR/1045938/5329762v.)

Gordon & Rees LLP

San Francisco, CA 94111

Page 602

TO-CORDON & REES, LLP 4

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Received Feb-11-08 O2:15pm

Gordon & Rees

2/11/2008 1:51

PAGE 002/002

Fax Server

1	MICHAEL T. LUCEY (SBN: 099927) MICHAEL A. LAURENSON (SBN: 190023)				
2	MARCIE S. ISOM (SBN: 226906)				
3	GORDON & REES LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000				
4	San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900				
5	Facsimile: (415) 986-8054				
б	Attorneys for Defendants S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE & YOUNGBERG,				
7	LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM LOCKARD				
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO				
9					
10	CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA ) CASE NO. CGC-07-467639				
11	SHEPARD, (PROPOSED) ORDER SUSTAINING				
12	Plaintiffs, DEMURRER				
13	Vs.				
14	S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,				
15	Defendants.				
16	Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for violation of Labor Code				
17	Section 970 came on regularly before this Court for hearing on February 11, 2008, at 9:30 a.m.,				
18	in Department 301. Michael Laurenson appeared for defendants and moving parties. Geoffrey				
19	White appeared for plaintiffs. The Court having read the papers submitted in support of and in				
20	opposition to said motion and having considered the arguments of counsel, and on good cause				
21	appearing therefor,				
22	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' demurrer is sustained with 10 days leave to				
23	amend to plead facts establishing tolling of the one-year statute of limitations, if plaintiffs can do				
24	so in good faith.				
25	Dated: , 2008				
	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT				
26	Approved as to Form:				

-I-ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-97-467639

27 28

Gordon & Rees LLP 275 Buttery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA, 94111

	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MICHAEL T. LUCEY (SBN: 099927) MICHAEL A. LAURENSON (SBN: 190023) MARCIE S. ISOM (SBN: 226906) GORDON & REES LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054  Attorneys for Defendants S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE & YOUNGBERG, LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM LOCKARD	ENDORSED Superior Court of California County of San Francisco  MAR 0 4 2008  GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk  BY:  Deputy Clerk
	9	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - C	OUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
	10	CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA ) SHEPARD,	CASE NO. CGC07-467639
s LLP Suite 2000 A 94111	12 13	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
Cordon & Rees LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111	14 15	vs.   S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,   )   Defendants.	BYFAX
275 E San	16 17 18 19 20 21	TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court entered	
	22.	Dated: March 3, 2008 GORDON	N & REES, LLP
	24 25	S&Y ASS YOUNG	ICHAEDA. LAURENSON s for Defendants SET MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE & BERG, LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM
	26	LOCKAF	<b>C</b> D _
MNT R/1042850/5463949	28	-1- Notice of Entry of	Order

Case3:08-cv-04392-WHA Document2-2 Filed09/18/08

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ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER -- CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

275 Battery Street, Suite 2000

Gordon & Rees LLP

Page 002

To-GORDON & REES, LLP 4

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Received Feb-11-08 02:15pm

Gordon & Rees

2/11/2008 1:51 PAGE 002/002

Fax Server

	1	MICHAEL T. LUCEY (SBN: 099927) MICHAEL A. LAURENSON (SBN: 190023)					
	2	MARCIE S. ISOM (SBN: 226906)					
	3	GORDON & REES LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000					
	4	San Francisco, CA 94111   Telephone: (415) 986-5900	•				
	5	Facsimile: (415) 986-8054					
	6	Attorneys for Defendants S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC; STONE &	L MAIRWANNA				
	7	LLC; JOSEPH PIAZZA; TOM LOCKARD	t TOUNGBERG,				
	8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO					
	9	SOI ELCON COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO					
	10	CATHERINE MOLNAR and PATRICIA SHEPARD,	) CASE NO. CGC-07-467639				
_	11	Plaintiffs,	) [PROPOSED] ORDER SUSTAINING ) DEMURRER				
5 Li. 2000 Suite 2000 A 94111	12	Vs.					
N Sept.	13	S&Y ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,					
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	14	Defendants.					
Cordon & Rees LLZ Buffery Street, Suite n Francisco, CA 94)	15	Defendants,					
Gordon & Rees 775 Battery Street, 8 San Francisco, CA	16	Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fifth	Cause of Action for violation of Labor Code				
5. S	17	Section 970 came on regularly before this Court for hearing on February 11, 2008, at 9:30 a.m.,					
	18	in Department 301. Michael Laurenson appeared for defendants and moving parties. Geoffrey					
	19	White appeared for plaintiffs. The Court having read the papers submitted in support of and in					
	20	opposition to said motion and having considered the arguments of counsel, and on good cause					
	21	appearing therefor,					
	22	IT IS HERBBY ORDERED that defendant	nts' demurrer is <u>sustained</u> with 10 days leave to				
	23	amend to plead facts establishing toiling of the one-year statute of limitations, if plaintiffs can do					
	24	so in good faith.					
	25	Dated: 2008					
	26	Appeared on to Prove	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT				
	27	Approved as to Form:	LIIDIT II A II				
	28	Attoriey for Plaintiffs					

ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER - CASE NO. CGC-07-467639

Page66 of 72

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275 Battery Street, Suite 2000

Gordon & Rees LLP

San Francisco, CA 94111

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Gordon & Rees LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000, San Francisco, CA 94111. On March 3, 2008, I served the within documents:

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.

by personally delivering the document(s) listed above via Docket Rocket to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.

by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon  $|\mathbf{X}|$ fully prepaid, in United States mail in the State of California at San Francisco, addressed as set forth below.

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, at a station designated for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight delivery by FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon & Rees LLP described below, addressed as follows:

Geoffrey V. White Law Office of Geoffrey V. White 351 California Street, Šuite 1500 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 362-5658 Facsimile: (415) 362-4115

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on March 3, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard v. Stone & Youngberg, et al. San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. CGC-07-467639

.

	CM-110		
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address):	FOR COURT USE ONLY		
Geoffrey V. White (SBN. 068012)			
Law Office of Geoffrey V. White 351 California Street, Suite 1500			
San Francisco, CA 94104			
TELEPHONE NO.: (415) 362-5658 FAX NO. (Optional): (415) 362-4115			
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): gvwhite@sprynet.com	,		
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiffs Molnar and Shepard	·		
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO	·		
STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street			
MAILING ADDRESS:			
CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Francisco, CA 94102			
BRANCH NAME:			
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: MOLNAR ET AL.			
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: S & Y ASSET MANAGEMENT et al.			
CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT	CASE NUMBER:		
(Check one): XX UNLIMITED CASE LIMITED CASE	CGC-07-467639		
(Amount demanded (Amount demanded is \$25,000			
exceeds \$25,000) or less)			
A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE is scheduled as follows:			
	_		
	Div.: Room:		
Address of court (if different from the address above):			
INSTRUCTIONS: All applicable boxes must be checked, and the specified	information must be provided.		
	•		
1. Party or parties (answer one):			
a. XX This statement is submitted by party (name): Plaintiffs Molnar & Shepard			
b This statement is submitted <b>jointly</b> by parties (names):			
2. Complaint and cross-complaint (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainants only)			
a. The complaint was filed on (date): September 27, 2007			
b The cross-complaint, if any, was filed on (date):			
3. Service (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainants only)			
a. XXX All parties named in the complaint and cross-complaint have been served,	or have appeared, or have been dismissed.		
b. The following parties named in the complaint or cross-complaint			
(1) have not been served (specify names and explain why not):			
(2) have been served but have not appeared and have not been of	dismissed (specify names):		
(3) have had a default entered against them (specify names):			
The following additional parties may be added (except), names parture of in	volvement in each and the data houghish		
c The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of in they may be served):	volvement in case, and the date by WHCR		
,			
4. Description of case a. Type of case in XX complaint cross-complaint (describe, including causes of action):			
Wrongful termination in violation of public policy;	breach of contract; fraud;		
Violation of Labor Code Sec. 970; intentional infli			

Page 1 of 4

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Molnar et al.

CM-110

CASE NUMBER:

DEF	ENDANT/RESPONDENT: S & Y Asset Management et al.	CGC-07-467639
4. b.	Provide a brief statement of the case, including any damages. (If personal injury damages claimed, including medical expenses to date [indicate source and amount], earnings to date, and estimated future lost earnings. If equitable relief is sought, description of Defendant Plaintiffs are former financial advisors of Defendant Plaintiffs were induced to move their residences by Dethen laid off. Plaintiffs allege their pay and benefit that their termination was in breach of contract, in by public policy, and discriminatory.	estimated future medical expenses, lost cribe the nature of the relief.) financial services company. afendants' false promises, its were discriminatory, and
	(If more space is needed, check this box and attach a page designated as Attachn	nent 4b.)
Th	ry or nonjury trial e party or parties request XXX a jury trial a nonjury trial (if more than o questing a jury trial):	ne party, provide the name of each party
6. Tri a. b.	ial date The trial has been set for (date): No trial date has been set. This case will be ready for trial within 12 months of t not, explain):	he date of the filing of the complaint <i>(if</i>
C.	Dates on which parties or attorneys will not be available for trial (specify dates and ex	plain reasons for unavailability):
	imated length of trial a party or parties estimate that the trial will take (check one):  TXX days (specify number): 10 days hours (short causes) (specify):	
The	representation (to be answered for each party) e party or parties will be represented at trial XX by the attorney or party listed in the Attorney:  Firm:  Address:  Telephone number:  Fax number:  E-mail address:  Party represented:  Additional representation is described in Attachment 8.	e caption by the following:
9. <b>Pre</b>	ference This case is entitled to preference (specify code section):	
10. <b>Alt</b> a.	ernative Dispute Resolution (ADR)  Counsel (AAA) has (AAA) has not provided the ADR information package identering reviewed ADR options with the client.	tified in rule 3.221 to the client and has
b.	All parties have agreed to a form of ADR. ADR will be completed by (date):	1 0006 1 5
C.	The case has gone to an ADR process (indicate status): Mediation in N Mediator Hon.	ovember 2006 before JAMS William Cahill (Ret.)

CM-110

	Citi-110
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Molnar et al.	CASE NUMBER:
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: S & Y Asset Management et al.	CGC-07-467639
10. d. The party or parties are willing to participate in (check all that apply):  (1) XX Mediation  (2) Nonbinding judicial arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141 arbitration under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.822)  (3) Nonbinding judicial arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141 before trial; order required under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.822)  (4) Binding judicial arbitration  (5) Binding private arbitration  (6) Neutral case evaluation  (7) Other (specify):	
e This matter is subject to mandatory judicial arbitration because the amount in configuration.  f Plaintiff elects to refer this case to judicial arbitration and agrees to limit recovery Procedure section 1141.11.  g This case is exempt from judicial arbitration under rule 3.811 of the California Rule.	y to the amount specified in Code of Civil
11. Settlement conference  XXX The party or parties are willing to participate in an early settlement conference (spec	ify when):
<ul> <li>12. Insurance</li> <li>a. Insurance carrier, if any, for party filing this statement (name):</li> <li>b. Reservation of rights: Yes No</li> <li>c. Coverage issues will significantly affect resolution of this case (explain):</li> </ul>	
13. Jurisdiction Indicate any matters that may affect the court's jurisdiction or processing of this case, and  Bankruptcy XX Other (specify): pending EEOC investigation; Status: Expecting right—to—sue letter after determination; further investigation by EEOC in approximately 30 d  14. Related cases, consolidation, and coordination a. There are companion, underlying, or related cases.  (1) Name of case: (2) Name of court: (3) Case number: (4) Status: Additional cases are described in Attachment 14a.  b. A motion to consolidate coordinate will be filed by (nat	Defendants now requested ays.
5. <b>Bifurcation</b> The party or parties intend to file a motion for an order bifurcating, severing, or coord action (specify moving party, type of motion, and reasons):	dinating the following issues or causes of
16. <b>Other motions</b> The party or parties expect to file the following motions before trial (specify moving p	party, type of motion, and issues):

CM-110

		CIVI-1 IU		
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER:	CASE NUMBER:			
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:	1. CGC-07-467639			
	s have completed all discovery.  overy will be completed by the date specified	d (describe all anticipated discovery):		
<u>Party</u>	Description	<u>Date</u>		
Plaintiffs Plaintiffs Plaintiffs	Request for Produ Defendants' Depos Expert Discovery			
c. The following disco	overy issues are anticipated (specify):			
of Civil Procedure : b. This is a limited civ	sections 90 through 98 will apply to this case il case and a motion to withdraw the case fr ed (if checked, explain specifically why ecor	00 or less) and the economic litigation procedures in Code e.  om the economic litigation procedures or for additional comic litigation procedures relating to discovery or trial		
19. Other issues  XX The party or parties request that the following additional matters be considered or determined at the case management conference (specify): Plaintiffs will amend to statutory claims for employment discrimination after EEOC investigation is concluded.				
20. Meet and confer  a. XX The party or parties have met and conferred with all parties on all subjects required by rule 3.724 of the California Rules of Court (if not, explain):				
After meeting and confer (specify):	ring as required by rule 3.724 of the Califor	nia Rules of Court, the parties agree on the following		
21. Case management orders Previous case management	orders in this case are (check one):	none attached as Attachment 21.		
22. Total number of pages attach	ned (if any):			
raised by this statement, and will	case and will be fully prepared to discuss the possess the authority to enter into stipulation authority of the party where required.	e status of discovery and ADR, as well as other issues on these issues at the time of the case management		
Date: March 25, 2008				
Geoffrey V. Whit	:e	Sult V UIL		
(TYPE OR PRIN	IT NAME)	(SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY)		
	•			
(TYPE OR PRII	NI NAME)	(SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY)  Additional signatures are attached		

#### PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Law Office of Geoffrey V. White, 351 California Street, San Francisco, CA 94104-2407. On March 25, 2008, I served the within

#### CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail in the State of California at San Francisco, addressed as set forth below.

Michael T. Lucey Gordon & Rees 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice and collection of processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on March 25, 2008, at San Francisco, California.

Maxine Clamage

Catherine Molnar and Patricia Shepard v. Stone & Youngberg, et al. Case No. CGC-07-467639

documents:

Proof of Service